

TCP 22-74

STATSPEC

Confidential

01 of 01

Trends in Communist Propaganda

22 May 74

**Confidential**

**F B I S**

# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

22 MAY 1974  
(VOL. XXV, NO. 21)

CONFIDENTIAL

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.



STATSPEC

National Security Information  
Unauthorized disclosure subject to  
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

## CONTENTS

### U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Observers Defend Summit, See Relations at Critical Stage. . . . . 1

### EUROPE

Moscow Sees Continuity in Bonn, GDR Extends Olive Branch. . . . . 4  
Moscow Satisfied With Giscard, Eastern Europe More Skeptical. . . . . 6

### ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR Blames Israeli "Perfidy" for Deaths in Ma'alot Incident. . . . . 8  
USSR Uses Jallud Visit to Bolster Image as Arab Supporter . . . . . 10

### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow Presents Case on Bilateral Relations, Border Talks . . . . . 14

### INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST

"Peaceful Intentions" Noted by Moscow, Ignored by Peking. . . . . 17

### INDOCHINA

Communist Attacks in South Vietnam Portrayed as "Punishment". . . . . 19  
North Vietnamese Editorials Mark Ho Chi Minh's Birthday . . . . . 20  
Hanoi Attacks Thai Policies, Sets Terms for Improved Relations. . . . . 21  
Peking Shows Measured Concern Over Vietnam Developments . . . . . 22

### PRC FOREIGN POLICY

PRC Ignores U.S. Asian Role on Anniversary of Mao Statement . . . . . 24

### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Husak Regime Seeks Accommodation With Political Outcasts. . . . . 25

### NOTES

Chou En-lai Status; PRC on Disarmament. . . . . 27

### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 MAY 1974

- 1 -

## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

## OBSERVERS DEFEND SUMMIT, SEE RELATIONS AT CRITICAL STAGE

A PRAVDA article has presented a strong argument for moving ahead with the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations despite U.S. domestic uncertainties. In making a case for the forthcoming Moscow summit, the 18 May article, by R. Vasilyev and V. Slavin, painted a more optimistic picture of recent U.S. developments than have other recent discussions. At the same time articles by USA Institute director Georgiy Arbatov and others in the most recent issues of USA and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS have warned that U.S.-Soviet relations are at a decisive stage and that movement forward is the only alternative to increased tensions.

Vasilyev and Slavin depicted a growing bipartisan support among diverse segments of the American public for detente with the Soviet Union. The existence of a "broad political base," in their opinion, overshadows "all the complexity and contradictions of the domestic political situation existing in the country and enables the American leading circles to follow the course set as a result of the Soviet-American summit meetings in Moscow and Washington." Brezhnev had alluded to the "complex and contradictory" nature of contemporary world affairs in his last major speech, in Alma Ata on 15 March.

Though the PRAVDA article did not mention Watergate specifically, it is clear that it was the major domestic "complexity" at issue. Since reporting the President's 29 April speech announcing that he was turning over transcripts to the House Judiciary Committee, Moscow has not reported ensuing developments, adhering to its normal policy of reporting major Presidential moves while ignoring other developments in the case. A hint of possible impending developments, however, was contained in a TASS report, carried in the central press on 17 May, of an interview in the Washington STAR-NEWS in which the President was quoted as saying that "if the House of Representatives decides to bring charges against me and discussion begins in the Senate, I am prepared to pursue the process to the end."

The PRAVDA authors' cautiously optimistic outlook on the prospects for further movement on the trade issue is noteworthy. Where in other recent commentary the Congress, as the major stumbling block to most-favored-nation status and credits for Moscow, has come in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 2 -

for some pointed criticism, Vasilyev and Slavin stressed the support of American business for expanded trade and concluded that "on the whole understanding is growing on Capitol Hill that the course taken by those legislators who are enemies of detente is in conflict with the national interests of the American people."

In expressing support for a third Brezhnev-Nixon meeting the PRAVDA article rejected arguments that the U.S. internal political situation dictates against it. Though the article did not characterize the prospects for such a meeting or discuss a specific agenda, the authors twice quoted American senators on the need for further arms limitation measures.

An article by M.O. Kolosov in the May issue of USA, signed to press 16 April, was devoted more specifically to the forthcoming summit. Perhaps reflecting the views of those Americanologists at the institute with a personal stake in improved U.S.-Soviet relations, Kolosov emphasized the need for specific measures and "substantial practical results" at the summit. His discussion of SALT reflected Moscow's recently more cautious public posture on timing, however. Where earlier in the year there were frequent references to the goal of reaching a permanent agreement in 1974, Kolosov said only that the "extremely complex" nature of the subject left "no room for premature decisions."

**CRITICAL STAGE** Kolosov's concern about the erratic progress of U.S.-Soviet relations was expressed even more dramatically by Arbatov in the same issue of USA. Arbatov argued, as he had in the wake of the Middle East crisis last October, that if the two countries miss the opportunities that now exist for further improving relations, "it may be too late tomorrow." Citing the analogy of a traveler with one leg raised to cross an obstacle, Arbatov noted that "he cannot remain in this position indefinitely: he must either cross the obstacle or turn back." Arbatov applied this analogy specifically to SALT. "If other steps do not follow in the near future," he affirmed, "the arms race will continue and even grow" with the attendant "serious political repercussions."

In the same vein the lead article in the May issue of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS by V. Nikitin, signed to the press on 19 April, warned that Soviet-U.S. relations were now at an "exceptionally important stage" and that "under these conditions it is particularly important that U.S. leaders consistently adhere to the general policy line sealed in the Soviet-U.S. agreements." Nikitin took issue in this respect

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 3 -

with U.S. policy on SALT and with last October's military alert, which was "objectively aimed at exacerbating the overall situation in the world and creating tension in Soviet-U.S. relations."

SUPREME SOVIET DELEGATION      Vasilyev and Slavin in their PRAVDA article cited the visit by the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation which began on 20 May as an example of the "profound constructive changes which are taking place in the mental attitude of Americans." Moscow has given prominent coverage to that visit, highlighting remarks by delegation head and CPSU Central Committee secretary Boris Ponomarev. TASS reported that IZVESTIYA of the 22d had devoted "almost an entire page" to reports on the visit. Moscow's reporting has not focused on substantive issues, though TASS quoted Ponomarev as telling both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Congress as a whole that he did not consider this a "protocol" visit but planned to discuss specific bilateral and international issues. He has been frequently quoted as stressing the progress that has already been made in improving U.S.-Soviet relations but also as urging further progress at SALT. According to TASS on 21 May, he told a group of senators that such progress was necessary since "given the present nature of armaments and the balance of armed forces, attempts at settling disputes by military means are fraught with the gravest consequences."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 4 -

## EUROPE

## MOSCOW SEES CONTINUITY IN BONN, GDR EXTENDS OLIVE BRANCH

Moscow has shown evident relief over the evolution of events in Bonn since the sudden 6 May resignation of Willy Brandt. Following some breath holding in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, prominent Moscow commentators both in the central press and on Moscow radio have begun to discuss at length the statements of the new government leaders and the implications of the change in government for future FRG-USSR relations. The thrust of this comment has been that the continuity of the SPD-FDP coalition, as well as the declarations of Schmidt and other leaders, indicates that the new Bonn government intends to continue the Brandt-Scheel policy toward the East. The GDR, in the meantime, with perhaps some arm twisting from Moscow, has responded positively to suggestions from the floor of the Bundestag that the process of improving FRG-GDR relations should be carried forward.

CONTINUATION OF  
OSTPOLITIK

The most thorough evaluation of the events since 6 May and their effect on Soviet-FRG relations was provided by IZVESTIYA's first deputy chief editor and German expert Nikolay Polyanov in Moscow radio's international observers discussion program on the 19th. Repeatedly citing the 17 May government statement by Schmidt, Polyanov asserted that "we now know that the policy of this cabinet will be the same as the policy of the preceding cabinet." Claiming that an "analysis" of Schmidt's policy statement "merely confirms" what observers had said since Brandt resigned, Polyanov concluded that the new Bonn government "will as much as possible embody continuity. . . ." Similarly, in the first commentary in the central press by a Moscow-based commentator, IZVESTIYA's A. Grigoryants on the 16th cited statements by Bonn leaders reassuring Moscow that the new leadership would not alter the "basic directions" of West German foreign policy.

Moscow, in the meantime, has apparently been able to persuade the East Germans to come forward with a conciliatory move toward Bonn. The occasion was provided by the "short, friendly visit" by GDR Council of Ministers Chairman Sindermann on 12-13 May. The reports on the visit, and on separate meetings with Kosygin and Brezhnev on the 13th, revealed that the talks ostensibly were focused on joint economic coordination; but the report on the Brezhnev meeting also noted that the leaders discussed "certain international questions" and "the strengthening of detente both in

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 5 -

Europe and throughout the world." Both meetings were said to have been held in an atmosphere of "complete unity of views."

Although no mention was made of German affairs, Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders almost certainly used the occasion to review the Brandt resignation and its repercussions. And with East Berlin on the 21st offering to hold discussions with the new Bonn leaders on issues including Berlin, it can be assumed that Moscow was successful in persuading East Berlin to make a gesture of reasonableness toward Bonn.

GDR RESPONSE TO BONN LEADERS      ADN reported on the 21st that an East Berlin foreign ministry spokesman, speaking for SED leader Honecker, stated that the GDR was "prepared to examine" proposals affecting FRG-GDR relations made by SPD deputy chairman and parliamentary floor leader Wehner on the 20th in the Bundestag debate on the new government's policy statement. The spokesman noted that "the GDR party and state leadership" shared Schmidt's view that "despite difficulties"--an obvious allusion to the Chancellor's reference to the "espionage case"--relations between the FRG and GDR "can be actively and further developed." The spokesman asserted that the GDR was "prepared to react positively" to the proposals of the Bonn leaders. Specifically, the spokesman said that the GDR was ready to examine proposals made by Wehner related to economic cooperation, the issue of conversion of money by West German visitors to the GDR, and the coordinating of energy supplies to include West Berlin.

The GDR spokesman ignored the double-edged statement by Wehner which seemed to include a suggestion that if East Berlin does not now move forward on issues of importance to Bonn in the FRG-GDR relationship, this could affect the development of economic relations between the two countries. Also, Wehner declared that all the treaties and agreements between Bonn and all the Warsaw Pact countries made up a whole, all parts of which must be followed both in spirit and letter. The implication seemed to be that Soviet-FRG as well as GDR-FRG economic relations would be affected. TASS carried textually the ADN report on the foreign ministry spokesman's statement. And GDR media on the 22d were quick to cite the very favorable reaction by Bonn leaders to the GDR spokesman's statement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 6 -

## MOSCOW SATISFIED WITH GISCARD, EASTERN EUROPE MORE SKEPTICAL

Moscow is accenting the positive in its initial comment on the victory of center-rightist candidate Giscard d'Estaing over the leftist coalition candidate Mitterrand in the 19 May run-off election elections for the French presidency. Focusing primarily on the foreign policy implications of the election, Moscow has indicated that it foresees a continuation of French policy and good relations with France along the general lines developed under de Gaulle and Pompidou. East European media, on the other hand, have stressed the narrow margin by which Mitterrand was defeated (50.8% to 49.2%), and have predicted a continuing important role for the leftist forces on the French domestic political scene.

## DETENTE AND COOPERATION

Moscow radio's French service, in a commentary on 20 May by V. Grigoryev, praised Giscard as an "energetic promoter" of Pompidou's "independent" foreign policy, which Grigoryev said included a policy of "detente, harmony, and cooperation" toward the USSR. Grigoryev mentioned twice in the same broadcast that Giscard has been chairman on the French side of the Soviet-French Grand Commission and that in this capacity he had visited the USSR and developed good relations with Soviet leaders. Citing Paris newspapers to the effect that Giscard "has always recognized the irreversible nature" of de Gaulle's policy toward the USSR, Grigoryev quoted Giscard as saying that future French policy will be similarly directed toward "detente and cooperation" with the USSR, as well as accompanied by expanded scientific, economic, and cultural relations.

## LEFTIST STRENGTH

Moscow's restraint toward Mitterrand's electoral achievement and its pragmatic, positive approach toward Giscard's victory--at least as reflected in limited, initial comment--stands in sharp contrast to the highly partisan attitude that most East European countries have shown toward the French left alliance. Virtually all East European comment has emphasized at length that the election results testify to the "enormous" and "unprecedented" strength of leftist political forces in France and presage increasing influence for the left alliance. Typical was a commentary on 21 May by T. Varkonyi, Paris correspondent for the Hungarian daily MAGYAR NEMZET, which said that the left had never come so close to governing France and that it would win victory in the 1978 elections.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 7 -

## ELECTION POST-MORTEM

Moscow and its East European allies have as yet made little attempt to delve publicly into the specific factors that led to Mitterrand's narrow defeat. Their analysis, for the most part, has been confined to suggesting that the vote was split along class lines, with an "arithmetic majority" going to Giscard while the majority of workers, youth, and intelligentsia supported Mitterrand. The most specific commentary to date from Soviet and East European sources which has sought to analyze Giscard's victory in terms of specific strengths and weaknesses of the candidates and their campaigns was provided by V. Kostov, Paris correspondent for Sofia radio, in a 20 May commentary over Sofia's domestic service. Citing the last four days of the campaign as "decisive"--probably because French polling results published on 15 May showed both candidates receiving equal percentages--Kostov referred to four major strengths exhibited by Giscard, coupled with two main weaknesses in Mitterrand's campaign. First, not only did all "bourgeois" parties support Giscard, but the "extreme leftwing forces" assisted him as well since "in appealing to their supporters to vote for Mitterrand, they stated at the same time that they did not entirely trust him." Second, whereas Giscard conducted a "lively" campaign, Mitterrand "for a long time stood on rather vague political positions trying to win votes from petit bourgeois circles." Third, Giscard had "solid" financial support, although Kostov refrained from repeating Mitterrand's lament in his concession statement that "the forces of money" had barely defeated "the people's movement." Finally, "anticommunism" was said to play a considerable role in drawing votes to Giscard.

Kostov's last point, although not further explained, is at variance with most other Soviet and East European comment, which has stressed to the contrary that one conclusion to be drawn from the election is that use of the "Red threat" and anticommunist themes are no longer effective in France. Although the basis for the latter and more prevalent assessment has been stated as the size of Mitterrand's vote, the difference in analysis may reflect uncertainty concerning the future of the leftist coalition, an uneasy alliance since its formation in 1972 and one whose fate is now in question after its failures in the 1973 parliamentary elections and on 19 May.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 MAY 1974

- 8 -

## ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

## USSR BLAMES ISRAELI "PERFIDY" FOR DEATHS IN MA'ALOT INCIDENT

In its reportage and comment on the 15 May Palestinian fedayeen operation in the Israeli town of Ma'alot, Moscow has contrived both to blame the Israelis for the tragic outcome of the affair and to reaffirm its standing condemnation of international terrorism in general. Delaying its first report until the 16th, when the Israelis launched retaliatory raids on Palestinian targets in Lebanon, Moscow was able to offset its reports of the Ma'alot incident with complementary reports of the Israeli attacks. Portraying worldwide indignation at Israeli "savagery," Moscow rejected the "pretext" that the attacks in Lebanon were in reprisal for the Ma'alot incident. While Moscow held "Israeli perfidy" responsible for the loss of lives at Ma'alot, some comment also expressed disapproval of terrorism in general and specifically, in one instance, of the Palestinian seizure of children as hostages.

MA'ALOT INCIDENT      The 16 May TASS account of the "tragic events" in Ma'alot, and a report by correspondent Orekhov in PRAVDA on the 17th, provided some details: Orekhov said the fedayeen demanded the release of 23 guerrillas in Israeli prisons in return for the release of 90 schoolchildren held hostage. He said the Israeli Government "allegedly" agreed to the demands but that half an hour before the Palestinian ultimatum expired, army detachments--"led" by Dayan--attacked the school, resulting in the death of the three Palestinians and the killing or wounding of many of the students.

The TASS and PRAVDA accounts set the theme for subsequent comment in charging that the "perfidious actions" of the Israeli military caused the tragedy, and that the inhabitants of Ma'alot themselves denounced the "treachery" of Tel Aviv and called Dayan a murderer. TASS commentator Kulik took up the condemnation of Dayan on the 20th, comparing him with Eichmann and accusing him of killing Israelis and then blaming others to provide an Israeli pretext for prolonging occupation of Arab lands.

---

\* From 1967 through 1970 Moscow from time to time issued TASS statements condemning Israeli "armed provocations" against neighboring Arab states. The last retaliatory action to draw a formal Soviet response--the Israeli incursion into Lebanon following the incident at the Munich Olympics in September 1972--was denounced in a Soviet Government statement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 9 -

INTERNATIONAL  
TERRORISM

While the Palestinian operation at Ma'alot could be construed as falling within the category of terrorist acts which Moscow has approved--internal as opposed to international acts, such as airplane hijackings--Moscow has not chosen to stress the distinction. Yermakov's international review in PRAVDA on the 19th placed equal blame on both Israelis and Palestinians, declaring that "perfidious attacks" of Israeli shock detachments on a school and "the seizure of children as hostages by the Palestinians" had brought condemnation by international public opinion. And Kolesnichenko's weekly review of events broadcast to North American listeners on the 20th also denounced terrorism in such a way as to apply to both parties. Referring to Israel's "revenge against Palestinian guerrillas," it went on to assert that the Soviet Union condemns terrorism, believing it can solve no political problems.

Moscow abstained from any criticism of the 11 April fedayeen operation in Qiryat Shemona, but seemed to convey its disapproval by indirection. Two days after that incident, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic carried an article by a Jordanian communist deploring "harmful and adventurous trends" in the policy of the Palestine Liberation Organization and remarking approvingly that the PLO planned to give up adventurous actions which greatly harmed its reputation and upset world public opinion. Comment at the time stressed a statement made earlier by PLO chairman 'Arafat to the effect that the fedayeen had suspended operations from territories of Arab countries adjacent to Israel and were conducting their activities "deep in Israel." Although Moscow has said nothing about this claim in the present instance, Lebanese and Palestinian spokesmen again indicated that the Ma'alot fedayeen did not come from Lebanon but were "sons of the occupied territory."

Soviet media failed to report the involvement of France and Romania in the Ma'alot affair as intermediaries at the request of the fedayeen. In reporting foreign reaction, TASS noted that the French foreign ministry declared that the Ma'alot incident could not justify attacks on Lebanon. But Moscow ignored AGERPRES' 18 May explanation of Romanian involvement and the agency's authorized statement expressing the disapproval of "the Romanian people" regarding both individual terrorist actions and Israeli reprisals.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 MAY 1974

- 10 -

## USSR USES JALLUD VISIT TO BOLSTER IMAGE AS ARAB SUPPORTER

Against the background of its deteriorating relations with Cairo and its efforts to assert a role in the diplomatic action in the Middle East, Moscow has played up the importance of Libyan Prime Minister Jallud's 14-20 May official visit to the Soviet Union. Although not announced by Moscow until 10 May, the visit had been rumored for some time, and Libyan Chairman al-Qadhdhafi had disclosed the date, as well as raising the possibility of a Soviet-Libyan "summit," in an interview with the Beirut AS-SAFIR on 28 April. The Jallud visit follows by three months his February tour of several European countries, including Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and has been presented by Libyan media as a continuation of that earlier round. Moscow Arabic-language comment on the visit included sharp digs at Egyptian policies, and Cairo newspapers responded in kind with sarcastic references to a marriage of convenience and to "political adolescents" trying to exploit Soviet-Egyptian differences.

**PROGRAM OF VISIT**      The length of Jallud's stay in the USSR was not announced in advance, although the Libyan news agency said on his departure for Moscow that the visit would last several days. According to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY on the 20th, he extended his visit a few more days, having been scheduled to leave Moscow for Leningrad on the 17th. The only reported speeches during the visit were made by Kosygin and Jallud at the welcoming dinner on the 14th; no remarks were reported at the luncheon which Jallud gave on the 16th. Moscow extended Jallud the same courtesy it had extended Syrian President al-Asad, a television interview, broadcast on the 21st, according to TASS. On his previous visit to the USSR on 23 February to 4 March 1972, Jallud had gotten the more normal treatment for Arab visitors, a radio interview broadcast on the Arabic-language service.\*

Jallud held a succession of "friendly" official discussions with Kosygin, as well as separate meetings with Brezhnev and Podgornyy on the 16th. Tripoli--but not Moscow--media indicated that Jallud had another meeting with Brezhnev on the 17th and also met with Defense Minister Grechko for two hours on the 19th. According to Libyan reports the talks were lengthy--with Brezhnev, five and a half hours, with Podgornyy over two hours, and with Kosygin the final day over four hours. His talks on his 1972 visit were also lengthy, according to Libyan reports.

---

\* The 1972 visit is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 24 February 1972, pages 37-38, and 8 March 1972, pages 29-32.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

Jallud last met with a Soviet leader when he was received by Podgornyy in Paris at the time of the de Gaulle funeral. According to PRAVDA on 8 April, they "exchanged views on certain questions of mutual interest." Presumably, Moscow was interested in sorting out the implications of al-Qadhdhafi's just-announced withdrawal from political and administrative functions to devote his time to "organizational and ideological" activities.

There was no mention of al-Qadhdhafi in Moscow's coverage of the Jallud visit. Kosygin in his dinner speech did acknowledge that Soviet-Libyan differences were "evidently chiefly in the field of ideology." Moscow media in the past have taken al-Qadhdhafi to task for his attacks on communism and his claims of a "true socialism" based on Islam. The communique papered over these differences. Thus it said that Jallud explained to his hosts the economic, social, cultural and other changes in Libya, while similar passages in the communiques on his East European visits noted that he also described "ideological" changes and Libyan efforts to preserve the country's "spiritual sanctities."

TRADE AND AID      The communique characterized Jallud's official talks with Kosygin as taking place in a friendly atmosphere "in a spirit of frankness and mutual understanding," the same description applied to his 1972 talks. A Tripoli radio commentary on 14 May described Jallud's visit as a continuation of the East European visits. The announced agreements followed much the same pattern. In Moscow, a trade agreement was signed and agreement was reached on establishing an intergovernmental commission on economic and scientific-technical cooperation. Similarly, Jallud had concluded trade and scientific-technical cooperation agreements in all three East European capitals and additionally an agreement on an economic commission in Budapest.

Soviet coverage of the visit contained hints but no firm confirmation that the discussions also included military cooperation, which would seem to have been indicated by Jallud's meeting with Grechko. Jallud was reported in a Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 14th as telling a TASS interviewer that there were wide prospects for development of Soviet-Libyan relations in political, economic, military and other fields. And a commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 13th remarked that the USSR and Libya were developing economic and technical cooperation and "cooperation in the field of defense."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 12 -

Jallud again invited Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin to visit Libya; in the 1972 communique, the invitation was extended on behalf of the Revolution Command Council, but this time by Jallud himself. Similar invitations were extended to the East European leaders by Jallud in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but on behalf of al-Qadhdhafi in Poland.

ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE Not surprisingly, in view of Libya's antipathy to any negotiated solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, there was no mention in the communique of the problem of disengagement. Kosygin, however, broached the subject in his dinner speech with an attack on "half measures." The communique condemned Israel, Zionism, and "imperialist forces supporting them" along the lines of the 1972 communique, which had also denounced U.S. support for Israel. The current document routinely insisted, reflecting the consistent Soviet line, that a "radical and all-embracing settlement" in the area is impossible without Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and insurance of the Palestinians' legitimate rights.

The communique pledged to continue "every assistance" to the Palestinian resistance movement. While this pledge is not a customary feature of Soviet-Arab communiques, TASS' report on the November 1973 visit of a Palestinian delegation to the USSR noted Soviet determination to continue assistance and support to the Palestinians' struggle for their legitimate national rights. During his East European tour Jallud obtained an expression of support for Palestinian self-determination from Poland, while Czechoslovakia and Hungary additionally supported the Palestinians' right to "return to their homeland."

Undertones of criticism of Cairo's domestic "liberalization" and emerging friendship with the United States appeared in a routine passage on Arab unity which, in contrast to the 1972 communique, this time called for unity of action on the basis of "social progress and democracy." And also unlike the 1972 communique, it called for struggle not only against the usual targets of imperialism and Zionism but against "reaction" as well. The USSR expressed determination to continue "every support" for Arab peoples "fighting for stronger national independence and for economic and social progress" and the communique stressed the importance of strengthening Arab-Soviet friendship "in all fields" as an important factor in the anti-imperialist struggle.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 13 -

Comment on the visit broadcast in Moscow's Arabic-language service and Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic also seemed aimed at disapproved tendencies in Cairo. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast on the 15th, for example, accused Arab reaction of collaborating with imperialism and Zionism by substituting partial measures for a comprehensive Middle East settlement. It claimed that these reactionary groups, whether they "are now in office or not," were trying to convince the Arab masses that American imperialism had suddenly changed from an Arab enemy to a friend. Another Radio Peace and Progress broadcast on the 18th complained that imperialism and Arab reaction were trying to upset Arab cooperation with the socialist countries by "introducing polemics and controversies which favor national interests." And a Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 13th seemingly cautioned Cairo on deviating from its "progressive" economic and social measures when it declared that the Soviet Union assisted the Arabs in consolidating their economic independence "on the basis of establishing supervision over the activity of foreign capital and introducing social changes."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 14 -

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW PRESENTS CASE ON BILATERAL RELATIONS, BORDER TALKS

IZVESTIYA on 16 May published a comprehensive analysis of the state of Sino-Soviet relations which reiterates the Soviet view that the next move to improve relations must come from Peking but also argues that in the interim the best policy is one of restraint, seeking an improvement in relations as the best means of encouraging healthy forces in Peking. The article was widely broadcast by Moscow radio over a four-day period. Authored by Oleg Borisov,\* the article also broke with Moscow's usual reticence on the border talks in Peking to offer the lengthiest defense of Moscow's position there since chief Soviet negotiator Leonid Ilichev last returned from Peking in July 1973.

Borisov accused Peking of "blocking" the talks by its "ultimatum-style demands" and its refusal to deal with narrower issues and specific sectors of the 4150-mile common border. He laid the blame for the "impasse" at the border talks and across the board in bilateral relations at the door of Peking. In evoking an image of Soviet reasonableness on bilateral issues and arguing that the next move is up to Peking, Borisov reiterated a Soviet posture spelled out late last year in official policy statements in the wake of the July 1973 Crimea summit of bloc leaders and the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in August. The reason for the appearance of the Borisov article at this time is unclear. It makes only a cryptic reference to the March incident involving the Chinese capture and detention of a Soviet helicopter and crew, as well as to the expulsion of Soviet diplomats in January, and thus seems related to longer-term difficulties in bilateral relations.

Borisov reiterated the line taken by both Brezhnev and Kosygin last fall in claiming that Moscow had acted responsibly, doing all it could to move relations off dead center, and that the next move was up to Peking. As part of the public rationale at that time for the

---

\* Borisov has written since at least the late 1960's on Sino-Soviet relations and international communist relations. Though his articles have as a rule not appeared to be particularly significant, they include a contribution to KOMMUNIST in the wake of the first 1969 border clash and one to PRAVDA on the second day of President Nixon's visit to the PRC in February 1972. See the TRENDS of 24 February 1972, page 13, for an analysis of the PRAVDA article.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 MAY 1974

- 15 -

Soviet position, Moscow began discussing more openly the various proposals it had made to Peking in and outside the border talks. Borisov revealed that in June last year Moscow had again proposed a Sino-Soviet summit as well as the non-aggression pact disclosed by Brezhnev last September in Tashkent.

Criticizing Peking for setting forth ultimatums and "absurd, unacceptable conditions" at the border talks, Borisov made a rare reference to the Soviet approach at the negotiations, noting that "the Maoists are in no way interested in solving questions connected with defining more precisely individual sectors of the Soviet-Chinese border." He also accused Peking of "flouting" an agreement that the substance of the talks should remain confidential.

## THE ANTI-CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN

Touching briefly upon the internal situation in China, Borisov asserted that "many people in the Peking leadership do not believe the farfetched fabrication of the 'Soviet threat'" and disagree with the prevailing "anti-Soviet course," and he noted that former Politburo member and Defense Minister Lin Piao had "probably" been among them. That assessment appeared to assign to the anti-Confucius campaign in China more immediate relevance for Sino-Soviet relations than have other commentaries which have emphasized leadership factionalism but have typically played down its significance for policy toward the Soviet Union. Recent Soviet analysis, for example, has not sought to differentiate among the current Chinese leadership. And commentaries in connection with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's recent trip to New York for the UNGA special session suggested that Moscow expected no change as a result of his political ascendance, labeling him a "veteran" anti-Soviet figure.

Moderate Soviet spokesmen such as Aleksandr Bovin, in a Sunday supplement to IZVESTIYA in April, have from time to time expressed optimism that eventually a change in leaders in Peking would bring a change in policy as well. But this has normally been seen only as a long-term development. The more typical Soviet assessment of the short-term effects of PRC infighting was presented in the 19 May international affairs roundtable on Moscow domestic radio. In an unusual move, the roundtable invited Vladimir Krivtsov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Far East Institute, to answer listener's letters on the internal situation in China. Krivtsov discounted the impact of the Confucius campaign on basic policy, claiming that whatever the "vacillations" in China's foreign policy course resulting from the internal political struggle, "it will remain a great power chauvinist course."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 16 -

Borisov's depiction of a leadership seriously divided over policy toward the Soviet Union could be seen as a counsel of restraint on his part. That attitude seemed visible elsewhere as well, in his acknowledgment of the "socialist gains" in China and his closing assertion that "any improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations undermines the positions within the country of Mao Tse-tung and his group."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 17 -

## INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST

## "PEACEFUL INTENTIONS" NOTED BY MOSCOW, IGNORED BY PEKING

Moscow promptly reported on 18 May the Indian Atomic Energy Commission's announcement of India's first successful explosion of a nuclear device. The TASS report noted India's efforts to advance the technology of peaceful explosions and cited the Commission's assertion that India has no intention of producing nuclear weapons. A second report on the 19th cited the Indian defense minister's statement that India would never use its nuclear capability for military purposes. Moscow has otherwise been silent on the test, failing thus far to comment or report other world reaction. In urging wider adherence by near-nuclear states to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the past, Moscow has gone on public record to the effect that there is no distinction between nuclear weapons and devices intended for peaceful purposes and hence a state carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions must be viewed as possessing nuclear weapons.

Moscow's allies in East Europe have also maintained a low profile on the Indian test, reporting factually and including India's protestations of no military intent. Yugoslavia has predictably reported more extensively on the details of the test and world reaction, but available commentary has shown reticence in criticizing India, a fellow stalwart of the nonaligned movement.

Peking responded initially with a straightforward 19 May NCNA report citing the Indian press regarding the size, location and underground nature of the nuclear explosion experiment. It made no reference to India's intentions. NCNA the following day reported Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto's press conference remarks on the 19th that Pakistan would not succumb to nuclear blackmail by India nor compromise positions for Kashmiri self-determination and against Indian domination on the subcontinent. While noting the prime minister's call for greater Pakistani unity at this time, NCNA ignored Bhutto's announcement that he is sending his foreign minister to China and other countries to discuss the implications of the Indian test.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 18 -

An Albanian radio commentary on the 19th criticized the blast and the "aggressive designs of the reactionary Indian clique," going on to assert that the test is "also the result of the extensive military assistance" provided by Moscow.

North Korea has not been heard to mention the test, while a brief report on Hanoi radio on 21 May reported the test of a "nuclear bomb" without including India's claims that it did not intend to produce military devices.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 19 -

## INDOCHINA

## COMMUNIST ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM PORTRAYED AS "PUNISHMENT"

A flurry of Vietnamese communist comment promptly hailed the 16 May communist "destruction" of the ARVN base at Dak Pek, Kontum Province, as justified "punishment" for Saigon's "war acts." Other communist attacks in recent days have drawn less attention from communist media, but news reports on the 15 May attacks in Binh Duong Province and on the 20 May explosion at the Nha Be fuel depot also portrayed these actions as retaliatory in nature.

A 17 May Liberation Radio commentary attempted to justify the attack on Dak Pek by accusing Saigon of launching ground, artillery, and air attacks from the base against PRG territory. Charging that Saigon wants to erase the "liberated area," the commentary praised "fierce counterblows" in the central highlands this month, especially the Dak Pek attack, and added: "This is a necessary and appropriate measure aimed at checking the Thieu clique's intensification of the war." Such counterattacks were also endorsed by Hanoi in articles in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 18 May. NHAN DAN dwelt upon U.S. responsibility in the current situation, charging that GVN attacks are "directed and abetted" by Washington.

Vietnamese communist comment does not recall the 15 October 1973 PLAF command order which set forth the policy of counterattacks and which has been cited in connection with communist offensive actions in the past.\* However, a Liberation Radio commentary, broadcast on the 18th and 19th, recalled that a 4 July 1973 order from the regional Kontum PLAF command had advocated counterblows against GVN military operations and attacks on the bases from which they originated.

Communist comment on the Dak Pek attack made no effort to obscure the fact that the base had long been controlled by the GVN. Thus, for example, the 17 May Liberation Radio commentary noted that "before and after the advent of the agreement, the Dak Pek base has served as a blocking position situated deep in the PRG-controlled area."

---

\* For a discussion of the 15 October PLAF order, see the TRENDS of 27 March 1974, pages 11-14.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 MAY 1974

- 20 -

In recent months, the communists have come closer to acknowledging that they have attempted to expand their areas of control since the peace agreement was signed in January 1973. Notably, in this connection, the latest six-point PRG proposal for a political settlement, issued on 22 March, did not repeat the call in similar proposals in April and June 1973 for a return of forces to positions occupied when the agreement was signed.\* Subsequently, a 26 March Liberation Radio commentary on fighting in Kontum suggested that the communists actually controlled more territory in that province than they did in January 1973, and a 29 March NHAN DAN editorial and other comment from Hanoi have claimed that "most areas" lost to the ARVN since the peace agreement had been retaken and that: "In many areas the strength and position of the revolution are better than prior to 28 January 1973."

#### NORTH VIETNAMESE EDITORIALS MARK HO CHI MINH'S BIRTHDAY

North Vietnam marked Ho Chi Minh's 19 May birthday, as it did last year, with editorials in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. While NHAN DAN recalled that Ho's testament had urged that the party and government draft effective economic and cultural plans and care for the people's livelihood, the army paper stressed the need to struggle for "final victory."

The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on Ho's birthday could be read as an argument for a new efforts to achieve advances in the South through military means. It maintained that the Vietnamese revolution "is a process of struggle to achieve one success after another" and that after a victory it is necessary to "consolidate our battleground" and strengthen forces to advance to "even greater victories." Noting that "as soon as one stage of the revolution ends, a new stage will start," the army paper added: "The current situation as regards the revolution in our country, as well as in the world, has given us new advantages to continue to develop our offensive strategy and advance to score new victories." The editorial in another passage called for preventing and overcoming negativeness, a lackadaisical attitude, and "pacificism"---a rarely mentioned error. Balancing its stress on the need to pursue victory, the editorial also noted, after citing the role of "collective interests," that "only by devoting all their strength and ability to building socialism can our cadres and party members progress toward a bright future."

---

\* The six-point PRG proposal is discussed in the TRENDS Of 27 March 1974, pages 11-14.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 21 -

## HANOI ATTACKS THAI POLICIES, SETS TERMS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS

Abandoning the attitude of restraint which marked its propaganda on Thailand following the installation of the civilian government in Bangkok last October, Hanoi in recent weeks has directed increased criticism against Bangkok policies related to sensitive issues in DRV-Thai relations. In particular, a 12 May NHAN DAN article, attributed to "Observer," charged that Bangkok's actions do not match its professions of goodwill toward the DRV and took the unusual step of listing Hanoi's conditions for improved relations. The Observer article was followed on the 18th by two DRV Foreign Ministry spokesmen's statements--one criticizing as deceptive the recent announcement of additional U.S. military withdrawals from Thailand and the other charging Bangkok with terrorizing Vietnamese residents in Thailand.

The 12 May Observer article castigated the Thai Government for asserting that its policy of goodwill toward Hanoi has not been reciprocated and listed a long bill of historical Vietnamese grievances against Thailand. The article acknowledged that the Sanya regime\* had issued positive statements regarding policy toward Hanoi and the rest of Southeast Asia, but said that it had failed to follow through with its announced intentions. Observer focused particularly on continued U.S. military presence in Thailand, Thai officials' allegations regarding North Vietnamese intentions against Thai national security, and Bangkok's policies toward Vietnamese nationals living in Thailand.

In specifying conditions for establishing "friendly relations" with Thailand, the article notably avoided a direct call for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country. It more generally asserted that Bangkok must "stop its collusion" with Washington against the Vietnamese, cease its alleged slanders against Hanoi's intentions toward Thailand, and release Vietnamese residents in Thailand who have been "illegally detained." However, a demand for U.S. withdrawal from Thailand was voiced in the 18 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the question which maintained that the United States must "immediately and completely withdraw" its military forces and installations and that the Thai Government "must not put the Thai territory at the United States' disposal."

---

\* The abrupt resignation of the Sanya cabinet on 21 May was noted on the same day in a Hanoi radio broadcast which cited Western press comment that there had been growing pressure in Thailand for a cabinet reshuffle and the removal of several ministers.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 22 -

**BACKGROUND** Hanoi's recent outburst caps the second major cycle in DRV propaganda treatment of Thailand over the past year and a half. In the immediate wake of the January 1973 Paris agreement, Hanoi had reduced its previously harsh invective against the conduct of the Thanom-Prapath regime and for three months avoided sharp criticism of Bangkok's association with U.S. military efforts in Indochina.\* Thailand's persisting association with Washington, especially in connection with U.S. bombing raids in Cambodia last spring and summer, prompted a revival of harsh anti-Thanom denunciations by late spring 1973.

Following the overthrow of Thanom and installation of the Sanya regime in October 1973, Hanoi once again reverted to a low posture. A 10 December QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary had labeled the new government as a case of "new wine in old bottles," but harsh invective was not revived until last month when a 16 April NHAN DAN commentary denounced the "vile, slanderous" remarks made earlier by Sanya regarding North Vietnamese military intentions toward Laos and Thailand.

#### PEKING SHOWS MEASURED CONCERN OVER VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS

At a time of increased Vietnamese fighting and the suspension of talks between Saigon and the PRG, Peking has departed from its low posture on Vietnamese affairs of recent months and endorsed PRG and DRV foreign ministry protests--of 15 and 17 May--in a 21 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article. Since last December Peking had sidestepped authoritative endorsement for its Vietnamese allies' statements at the foreign ministry level or below. The Chinese this year have only once responded authoritatively to Vietnamese statements--a 26 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article seconded PRG and DRV Government statements announcing the communists' revised six-point plan. The last authoritative Peking endorsement of Vietnamese protests at the foreign ministry level came in an 8 December 1973 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article just prior to the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks that month.

The present article as usual focused the brunt of invective against Saigon violations, but also castigated the United States for leaving behind disguised military personnel, replenishing

---

\* The change is discussed in the TRENDS of 25 July 1973, pages 7-8.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 23 -

military and economic aid to Saigon, and threatening the Vietnamese. This represented harsher treatment than the 26 March 1974 article, but was somewhat milder than the 8 December 1973 article which had accused Washington of "brazen provocations" against the Vietnamese. In contrast to the article last December, there was this time no direct Chinese demand that Washington halt its violations and scrupulously implement the Paris accord. NCNA's replay of the PRG and DRV statements predictably dropped references to the Nixon Administration and Nixon Doctrine and the accusation that Washington is the "mastermind" behind Saigon's "sabotage" of the Paris accord.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 24 -

## PRC FOREIGN POLICY

## PRC IGNORES U.S. ASIAN ROLE ON ANNIVERSARY OF MAO STATEMENT

Peking's recent sanguine posture regarding the U.S. presence in Asia is strikingly apparent in comment marking the fourth anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's 20 May 1970 anti-U.S. united front statement, issued in response to the U.S. moves against Vietnamese communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. Thus, a PEOPLE'S DAILY article on the anniversary made no direct mention of a U.S. role in Indochina or elsewhere in Asia. Chinese speeches during the early April visit in Peking of a Cambodian Front delegation led by insurgent armed forces chief Khieu Samphan\* recalled the 1970 Mao statement to underline Chinese unity with the Cambodian and other revolutionary struggles; however, Peking was careful to avoid stressing the anti-U.S. features of the Mao statement. The total avoidance by the PEOPLE'S DAILY article of any mention of the U.S. role is the more notable since it appeared on the very day that Khieu Samphan returned to Peking from a lengthy tour abroad.

While excerpts from the 20 May statement are frequently quoted in PRC media, especially the remark that "revolution is the main trend in the world today," with the movement toward improved Sino-U.S. relations the anniversary has not received high-level attention. For the past three years the date has been marked only by PEOPLE'S DAILY articles attributed to a worker. The current article reiterated the foreign policy thesis articulated in Chou En-lai's report to the CCP Congress last August that world disorder stemming from U.S.-Soviet rivalry and third world opposition to the superpowers is the salient feature of the present age and is advantageous to China and oppressed peoples throughout the world. While acknowledging that Washington and Moscow may reach agreement on some detente-related issues, it reaffirmed that their strategic rivalry is "absolute and irreconcilable," demonstrating that Peking continues to see ample opportunity for advantageous Chinese maneuvering in the triangular relationship. The article also underscored Peking's continuing differentiated view of the superpowers, singling out Moscow's "inordinate ambition" for special criticism while offering a routine critique of the United States. It reaffirmed Peking's stance that while China is vigilant against war caused by the superpowers, it is particularly on guard against any "surprise attack" launched by the USSR.

---

\* The speeches are discussed in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 11-15.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 25 -

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## HUSAK REGIME SEEKS ACCOMMODATION WITH POLITICAL OUTCASTS

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) appears to be seeking an accommodation with scientists and technically trained personnel alienated by the 1968 events as well as those expelled from the party. Although the terms of the accommodation remain unclear, a conciliatory offer was issued at the 14-15 May Central Committee plenum which considered problems of scientific-technological development in the economy. The offer appearing in the official resolution of the plenum represented a setback for hardline elements favoring removal of "revisionists" from scientific and other intellectual work.

The CPCZ plenum resolution, published in the 17 May RUDE PRAVO, stressed the "irreplaceable role" of the scientific intelligentsia in society and declared that the party "highly appreciates" its past contributions. The resolution thus implicitly acknowledged that the economy cannot function without highly skilled personnel. As an inducement for improved social collaboration the resolution went on to state that in the future, practical accomplishments rather than past political views will be the test by which intellectuals are to be judged: "This also goes," the resolution stated, "for those with whom the party parted company in the past but who now realize their mistakes and through their positive efforts demonstrate their attitude to our society and help to develop it."

The conciliatory approach embodied in the plenum resolution was also evident in the CPCZ Presidium report delivered by Presidium member Josef Kempny. Kempny noted that the party will seek to increase the participation "of all honest scientific and technological workers" in the economy and that this requires "an atmosphere supporting scientific inquiry. . . ." However, he warned, as did the plenum resolution, that "all scientific work should be systematically based on the ideological foundation of Marxism-Leninism."

Hardline concerns about the dangers of adopting a more tolerant attitude toward the scientific intelligentsia were for the most part conspicuously muted at the plenum. Two traditionally hardline Presidium members who might have been expected to raise such fears, ideological commission chairman Vasil Bilak and trade

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 26 -

union leader Karel Hoffmann, both of whom chaired sessions of the Presidium, reportedly did not speak. Another, Prague party chief Antonin Kapek, restricted his remarks to technical matters.

The only fully hardline speech was delivered by Jan Fojtik, a Central Committee secretary and ideological commission member, who attacked the tolerant approach to the scientific intelligentsia by which "persons who have no future, for either political or technical reasons. . . , are allowed to keep their position." Recalling the "extremely benevolent attitude" that led to the Prague Spring, Fojtik warned that revisionists "will undoubtedly do everything possible to make a comeback and start a new onslaught as soon as the first opportunity arises."

The paucity of comment from hardliners contrasts sharply with the plenum discussions on ideological tasks of October 1972. At that time Bilak delivered the Presidium report and warned that "it would be an unforgivable mistake if we were to succumb to self-satisfaction, if we were to let up on our work. . . ." The following month at a Slovak party plenum Bilak revealed that within the party hierarchy there were some like himself who favored a "tough course" and others--an allusion to moderates led by General Secretary Husak--who took a "blue sky" approach, being satisfied with a more conciliatory attitude toward the scientific intelligentsia and other social groups. The next step in the process of accommodation will probably have to await the outcome of the struggle for the succession activated by the imminent death of President Svoboda.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 27 -

## NOTES

CHOU EN-LAI STATUS: Premier Chou's public appearances during the 17-21 May visit to Peking by Archbishop Makarios followed the pattern set during Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto's visit earlier this month. Chou was absent from airport ceremonies, banquets and some discussions with Makarios, but did greet him at the guesthouse, participate in the first round of bilateral talks, and attend Makarios' audience with Mao on the 18th. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping acted as host during most of the talks and ceremonies and was again careful to note, in his 18 May banquet speech, that he had been "entrusted" by Chou to host the gathering. Official photographs of Mao's meetings with Bhutto and Makarios showed Teng sitting in Chou's traditional seat to Mao's right. It is not clear whether the seating change symbolizes an increase in real status for Teng personally, or merely indicates that he was acting as chief host. During the visit of Senegal President Senghor, Chou and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien were both present and Chou retained his traditional seat. This meeting was prior to Chou's apparent indisposition, however, which occurred two days later, after which Li substituted for Chou at functions for Senghor and then accompanied Senghor on a tour around China. Li is also maintaining a full schedule as a Chou substitute, and NCNA's 18 May listing of those who sent wreaths to the funeral of an NPC member showed Li still in his usual rank order just ahead of Teng.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 28 -

PRC ON DISARMAMENT: Peking has never acknowledged the Soviet call, on 16 April, for the participation of "all nuclear powers" in the 25-state disarmament negotiations in Geneva. However, the PRC position was made clear in a 16 May PEOPLE'S DAILY article by Hsiang Ming which ridiculed "so-called disarmament meetings," especially the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. In reporting the CCD session of 16 April, NCNA had ignored Soviet representative Roshchin's call for "enlisting in the negotiations on disarmament all militarily powerful countries, including all nuclear powers, and first and foremost, the Chinese People's Republic whose negative stand provides one of the major obstacles to the implementation of disarmament programs." The PEOPLE'S DAILY now characterizes the talks as "forlorn" and "on the verge of death," adding that they serve little purpose other than to allow Moscow to play its "title role" as the "world's top-ranking trumpeter" of fraudulent disarmament. The article also typically differentiated between the two superpowers. It not only castigated Moscow's "hypocrisy" in pleading detente while expanding arms but went so far as to cite Defense Secretary Schlesinger to bolster its charge: It quoted the Secretary as saying that Washington's arms buildup is needed because Moscow "sees no inconsistency between detente and increasing military capabilities."

CONFIDENTIAL



FBIS TRENDS  
22 MAY 1974

- 1 -

## APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 13 - 19 MAY 1974

<u>Moscow (2996 items)</u>			<u>Peking (933 items)</u>		
Supreme Soviet Elections	(7%)	10%	Pakistan Prime Minister	(5%)	16%
China	(8%)	6%	Bhutto in PRC		
GDR Premier Sindermann	(--)	5%	[Joint Communique	(--)	4%]
in USSR			Cypriot President	(--)	8%*
Libyan Premier Jallud	(--)	4%	Makarios in PRC		
in USSR			Criticism of Lin Piao	(4%)	5%
Chile	(1%)	3%	and Confucius		
[Upcoming Trial of	(--)	2%]	Indochina	(10%)	5%
"Patriots"			PRC-Japan Air Agreement	(--)	4%
Portuguese Coup Aftermath	(1%)	3%	Senegal President	(12%)	3%
Arab-Israeli Issue	(9%)	3%	Senghor in PRC and		
FRG Elections	(--)	3%	DPRK		
Soviet Leaders' Greetings	(--)	3%	USSR	(1%)	3%
on Yugoslav Leaders'					
Reelection					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

---

\* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Makarios.